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a Bayesian theory of scientific inference is, as Jeffreys (1967, p. 8) put it, to "tidy up" the process, so too might
Bayesian methods improve what advisors to policy makers do informally. In principle, the paradigm is simple and, in its ability to accommodate a variety of beliefs, it is comprehensive. Yet the Bayesian approach has its difficulties, for while it is surely desirable to express beliefs explicitly, in particular through models, it is often difficult to do so accurately. Lurking beside each analysis are the interrelated dangers of oversimplification, overstated precision, and neglect of beliefs other than the analyst's.
In the authors' model (3.2), the normal exchangeable prior on 8 is probably the most important cause for concern. Interspecies comparisons begin with the assumption that results among different species and toxic agents are somehow related, and that the data carry information about the relationships. The normal exchangeable prior, however, represents a firm belief in a very simple situation; its use entails a strong statement about the behavior of the interactions. It is plausible that some groups of species are sufficiently similar with respect to the toxic action of some groups of agents, that, within those groups, model (3.2) would not be grossly inaccurate. In principle, the model could be modified to allow for grouping and, in Section 5, the authors provide an illustration of this sort of modification. However, it is not clear how the model, then the resulting variance is inappropriately small. Consider, for example, the value c* = 1.02 for roofing tar in Table 2 . My own reaction to that number is that it is too small and, to interpret it, I crudely but quickly modify model (3.2) by mixing it with the model that assumes no relationship among the entries in Table   1 . In addition, since the original data come from an observational study, the standard deviation of 1.41 might be considered too small, and, before mixing, it could be replaced with a value considered more realistic. Thus, my modified posterior, based on viewing Table 2 , would be roughly equal to a mixture of the reported posterior and the variance-inflated original (normally distributed) data.
Even greater overstated precision results from the model selection described in Section 6. Evaluation of precision is worrisome whenever the same data are used both to select the model and to make inferences. Here, the problem is compounded. Not only is each estimate affected by the selection of entries in its row and column, but both the estimate and its variance are affected by increased homogeneity of the interactions. In particular, I would not agree with the conclusion that knowledge of the human roofing tar log slope may be summarized by a Normal( 1.53, (.74)2) distribution.
The concern expressed here about difficulties in applying the authors' methodology raises a general question of policy analysis: how much inferential and decisiontheoretic formalism should be used? A second issue that arises in this and many other policy problems is, at what stage in the process should enter the desire for adequate caution with regard to human risk? In arriving at a policy decision, scientific evidence must be assessed and social values must be evaluated and considered. Some argue that it is important to distinguish, as much as possible, the assessment phase from the evaluation and decisionmaking phase of policy formulation. A thorough assessment would then include descriptions of the consequences of proposed actions, the likelihoods of their occurrence, and the actions that should be taken under each possible set of assignments of value to the consequences. The use of Bayesian decision theory in this context is described in detail by Keeney and Raiffa (1976) . A complication is that probabilities under various assumptions may differ widely (as they usually do for dose-response models). While, in principle, the probability of an outcome may be expressed as a mixture over the assumptions, in practice the probabilities of the validity of the assumptions may be extremely difficult to obtain. One solution to this problem would further complicate an already elaborate scheme by providing assessments according to each of the many possible combinations of were really critical factors. Our adoption of the naive exchangeability assumption, as well as our choice of a diffuse prior distribution for the relative potencies, reflected our desire not to impose vague and controversial beliefs on the reader at the outset.
Once the consequences of exchangeability were detailed, we were in a better position to study the effects of prior information in Section 5. In that section, we specifically assumed that the diesel emissions had biologically similar effects-a belief that we regarded as straightforward and uncontroversial. We showed how
